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Whose Phone Line Is It Anyway: A Prosecutor’s Guide to
Navigating the Evidentiary Gold Mine of Prison Phone
Calls
Introduction
Prison phone calls offer a treasure trove of prospective evidence to be
used in a criminal trial. Often, a defendant will make an incriminating
statement on a prison phone call even after being warned that the calls may
be recorded. 1 Prosecutors can use the statements made in these phone calls
in a wide variety of ways: to establish certain facts or events, to evaluate
witness credibility, to impeach, to bolster their cases, or to corroborate
additional evidence at trial. Individual party admissions may be easily
admissible, 2 while other more complicated statements, such as
coconspirator statements, require additional steps prior to admission.3 This
Comment provides prosecutors a comprehensive guide—paired with simple
examples and solutions—to introduce prison phone calls into evidence and
discusses the specific hurdles one must overcome to effectively filter
through prison phone call statements. In addition, this Comment notes how
courts may disagree on the interpretation of what it means for a statement to
be “in furtherance of a conspiracy” once the coconspirator is incarcerated.4
To begin, Part I of this Comment shows how the prison phone call
system operates in the federal system. Part II explains the process of
introducing a statement, avoiding the rule against hearsay, and provides
examples to show how the hearsay exceptions apply to prison phone calls.
Part III provides analysis of a few exceptions, giving a framework for
prosecutors to use and emphasizes the ease of introducing this information
while noting potential objections defense counsel may raise. Part IV
provides the conclusive, overall procedure to consider prior to submitting
the phone calls into evidence.

1. See generally Amy Pavuk, Jail Phone Calls a Nightmare for Defense Attorneys,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Apr. 26, 2014), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2014-0426/news/os-jail-phone-call-used-against-you-20140426_1_jail-phone-calls-jailhouse-phoneshellie-zimmerman.
2. See infra Section II.B.
3. See infra Section II.D.
4. See infra Section III.D.
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I. How the Federal Phone System Operates
The federal prison phone call system is heavily regulated.5 The Code of
Federal Regulations governs federal prisons, 6 but wardens maintain
discretion in managing many aspects of the prisons, such as inmate contact
with persons in the community through the use of telephones. 7 Phone
regulations are extremely favorable to the warden, who is only required to
allow an inmate to make one phone call per month.8 The central purpose of
phone privileges is to provide means for an inmate to maintain ties with
family or community for personal development. 9
Prisons commonly limit the individuals an inmate can call 10 and the
prison must maintain a call list containing preapproved numbers. 11 The
Federal Bureau of Prisons (“Bureau”) attempted to require inmate-phonecall recipients to provide personal information prior to the approval of the
phone list, but the proposal was abandoned and amended to require that
inmates concede “to the best of the inmate’s knowledge, the person or
persons on the list are agreeable to receiving the inmate’s telephone call and
that the proposed calls are to be made for a purpose allowable under Bureau
policy or institution guidelines.” 12 This leaves some discretion to the
inmates and allows them the opportunity to contact individuals who may
not be on the approved list, as prisons often do not have the adequate
workforce and time to constantly keep up with these lists. 13
While a prison may ban the use of three-way calls for inmates, phone
call recipients may utilize a three-way call, therefore sidestepping the
5. See generally 28 C.F.R. §§ 540.100-105 (2015).
6. See generally id. § 0.95.
7. Id. § 540.100(a).
8. Id. § 540.100(b). A prison can restrict an inmate’s phone calls to an even greater
extent if the inmate requires disciplinary sanctions. Id.; see also 3 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN,
RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 14:18 (4th ed. 2011).
9. 28 C.F.R. § 540.100(a); Stay in Touch, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.
gov/inmates/communications.jsp (last visited Mar. 29, 2017) (“We extend telephone
privileges to inmates to help them maintain ties with their families and other community
contacts.”).
10. 28 C.F.R. § 540.100(a); MUSHLIN, supra note 8, § 14:19.
11. 28 C.F.R. § 540.101 (providing a general call list estimate); MUSHLIN, supra note 8,
§ 14:19.
12. Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1098 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting 28 C.F.R. §
540.101(a)(1)); MUSHLIN, supra note 8, § 14:19.
13. See Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A]llowing
Valdez telephone access would have required the defendants to allocate additional resources
to monitor his telephone conversations to ensure that he did not try to tip off his cohorts.”).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss4/5

2017]

COMMENTS

737

benefits of requiring a phone call list. 14 Another situation arises where the
phone call recipient can put another person on the line to speak to the
inmate. 15 This action may be planned, as where a mother puts her son on
the line to speak to his father, 16 or it can be unplanned, as where other
people force their way onto the phone. 17 In either event, additional
authentication may be required to introduce these statements made by thirdparty phone call recipients. 18
Many prisons record these phone calls and give proper notice to
inmates 19 so that calls might be monitored; and when an inmate uses the
phone system, this establishes implied consent. 20 The primary purpose of
recording these calls is to maintain security, uphold orderly management,
and provide protection to the public.21 Inmates may talk to a variety of
individuals ranging from friends, family, coworkers, acquaintances, and
significant others, thus presenting many opportunities for valuable
evidence.
To obtain this valuable evidence, a prosecutor must first secure leave of
court and issue a subpoena on the prison to obtain the phone call
recordings. 22 Prison officials may view the subpoenas as “mere formalities”
and will likely work hand in hand with the prosecution team. 23 To ensure
14. See Brutcher v. Cassady, No. 4:11CV1613 ACL, 2014 WL 4823952, at *11 (E.D.
Mo. Sept. 26, 2014), for an example of a prison three-way call through a cell phone.
15. See, e.g., Martinez v. Biter, No. EDCV 14-1883 JGB (AS), 2015 WL 3407930, at
*1-2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2015).
16. Id. at *1.
17. Id. at *1-2.
18. See FED. R. EVID. 901(a); United States v. Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189, 1203-05 (9th Cir.
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2350 (2015) (providing an example of a court’s analysis when
authenticating prison phone call evidence).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Chaiban, No. 2:06-CR-00091-RLH-PAL, 2007 WL
437704, at *8 (D. Nev. Feb. 2, 2007) (“The telephones play a ‘preamble’ which notifies the
caller and the recipient that the call may be monitored and/or recorded. If the recipient
wishes to accept the call, he or she presses the “0” key on the phone.”); Stay in Touch, supra
note 9 (“A notice is posted next to each telephone advising inmates that calls are
monitored.”).
20. Hill v. Donoghue, 815 F. Supp. 2d 583, 588 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Where a prison
gives notice to inmates that their calls may be monitored, inmates’ use of the prison’s
telephones constitutes implied consent for the purposes of Title III.” (citing United States v.
Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 19-20 (2d Cir. 1988)), aff’d, 518 F. App’x 50 (2d Cir. 2013).
21. 28 C.F.R. § 540.102(a) (2015).
22. United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480, 1494 (S.D. Fla. 1991); see also
Chaiban, 2007 WL 437704, at *13 (“The public does not have access to inmate phone calls
without a subpoena. Law enforcement does have access to the calls.”).
23. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. at 1493-94.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

738

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:735

compliance with Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a
prosecutor must be able to show she exerted a “genuine effort to obtain
identifiable and relevant evidence.”24 Therefore, she must show what is
believed to be on the tape, avoiding a wide-ranging “fishing expedition” for
evidence. 25
The vast pool of evidence provided by prison phone call recordings
includes acquired statements, which may be used to impeach a witness,
bypass spousal immunity, establish individual party admissions, and bring
in coconspirator statements. An individual party admission or impeachment
evidence may be easily introduced,26 while a coconspirator statement must
clear additional hurdles. 27 These party admissions are nonhearsay under
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) and are easily admissible when offered
against the party. 28 Though also nonhearsay under 801(d), coconspirator
statements have additional requirements—such as showing the statements
were made by a party during and in furtherance of the conspiracy—that
make using a prisoner’s statement against others more challenging. 29
II. Admitting Prison Phone Calls into Evidence
While Congress has the power to legislate all rules of civil, criminal,
appellate, and bankruptcy procedure alike, the rules of evidence have
always been given adequate attention. The importance of evidentiary
questions is deeply rooted in the legal system:
[A]ll questions upon the rules of evidence are of vast importance
to all orders and degrees of men: our lives, our liberty, and our
property are all concerned in the support of these rules . . . and
are now revered from their antiquity and the good sense in which
they are founded. 30
For that reason, evidentiary rules warrant significant attention from courts.
Look no further than a criminal trial: evidentiary rules often determine a
defendant’s fate.

24. Id. (citing Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 220-21 (1951); United
States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1980)).
25. Id. at 1492-93.
26. See infra Section II.B.
27. See infra Section II.D.
28. See infra Section II.B.
29. See infra Part III.
30. Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290, 295 (1813).
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Prison phone calls offer massive pools of potential evidence for
prosecutors to use in criminal trials, but the necessary requirements for
admitting certain statements are dense, detailed, and problematic.
Prosecutors may not have ample time to filter through prison phone calls,
so the following sections provide key statements and procedures to
efficiently navigate prison phone call recordings.
A. Opposing Party Statements
To begin, opposing party statements offer the best route for bringing in
evidence from a prison phone call when used against the party/defendant.
Specifically, party-opponent admissions are exempted from the rule against
hearsay based “on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is the result
of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the
hearsay rule.” 31 Two types of statements are likely to arise in a prison
phone call: a statement “made by the party in an individual or
representative capacity” 32 or a statement “made by the party’s coconspirator
during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” 33 A coconspirator statement
must clear additional evidentiary obstacles before being admissible in
court. 34
B. Individual Admissions
An individual admission made by a party-opponent is simple. For
example, Albert is incarcerated and calls his friend Brandon through a
prison phone line. Albert tells Brandon that he hid the murder weapon at
Brandon’s house, but Brandon did not participate in the murder. This
statement is not hearsay and is admissible as an individual party admission
under 801(d)(2)(A). 35
Another easy way to utilize prison phone calls is to bypass the spousal
communication privilege. Prison phone calls are monitored and spouses are
made aware of the phone call recordings, therefore the privilege does not
apply because it only protects statements made in confidence.36 While these
31. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
32. Id. 801(d)(2)(A).
33. Id. 801(d)(2)(E).
34. See infra Part III.
35. “A party’s own statement is the classic example of an admission.” FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(A) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
36. See United States v. Madoch, 149 F.3d 596, 602 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Janice admits she
knew Larry was in jail while she was talking to him. Thus, because the marital
communications privilege protects only communications made in confidence, under the
unusual circumstances where the spouse seeking to invoke the communications privilege

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

740

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:735

present the easiest way to bring in prison phone calls, adding a conspiracy
can change the requirements of introducing statements made from prison
phone lines.
C. Understanding Hearsay
Before jumping into coconspirator statements, a short background on
hearsay is necessary to understand how and why coconspirator statements
fall within a hearsay exception. Hearsay is defined as a statement 37 that “(1)
the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing;
and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in
the statement.” 38 Reading this definition alone makes it seem likely that
prison phone calls are hearsay because they contain statements that were
not made while testifying at trial that will be offered for their truth.39
The Federal Rules of Evidence include a broad prohibition against using
hearsay, save for exceptions, otherwise provided by statute, another rule of
evidence, or any other rules set out by the Constitution and the Supreme
Court. 40 The purpose of the hearsay rule lies in its design: it serves to
prevent unreliable hearsay from being admitted, but also permits reliable
hearsay through one of the many exceptions laid out in the rules. 41 The
hearsay rule “is based on experience and grounded in the notion that
untrustworthy evidence should not be presented to the triers of fact.” 42

knows that the other spouse is incarcerated, and bearing in mind the well-known need for
correctional institutions to monitor inmate conversations, we agree with the district court
that any privilege Janice and Larry might ordinarily have enjoyed did not apply.” (citations
omitted)).
37. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). A statement can be an oral or written assertion, or any
nonverbal conduct, “if the person intended it as an assertion.” Id. 801(a).
38. Id. 801(c).
39. Cf. id. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules (“Admissions by
a party-opponent are excluded from the category of hearsay on the theory that their
admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the
conditions of the hearsay rule.”). Many inmates object to the admissibility of prison phone
calls, claiming a violation of their Due Process and Fourth Amendment rights, but courts
consistently decline these objections because the prisons provide proper notice and follow
the procedure laid out by the Bureau. See generally United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d
15, 20-22 (2d Cir. 1988) (conducting a Fourth Amendment analysis); Kimberlin v. Quinlan,
774 F. Supp. 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 1991) (conducting a Fifth Amendment due process analysis),
rev’d on other grounds, 6 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated, 515 U.S. 321 (1995).
40. FED. R. EVID. 802.
41. Ferrier v. Duckworth, 902 F.2d 545, 547 (7th Cir. 1990).
42. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973).
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Courts usually exclude these out-of-court statements “because they lack the
conventional indicia of reliability.” 43
The foundation of the conspiracy theory hearsay exception rests on
agency theory where “each member of a conspiracy is the agent of each of
the other conspirators whenever he is acting.”44 The Court disfavors
attempts “to broaden the already pervasive and wide-sweeping nets of
conspiracy prosecutions.” 45 These wide-sweeping nets can favor a
prosecutor bringing in evidence of a conspiracy case because they may
receive “some leeway to define the objectives of the conspiracy.”46
D. Coconspirator Admissions
For conspiracy cases, some statements taken from prison phone call
recordings can become particularly tricky. These include party-opponent
statements made “during and furtherance of the conspiracy.” 47 If a
prosecutor wants to introduce evidence against a coconspirator not yet
incarcerated and on the other end of the phone line, he must establish three
additional things before the evidence can be admitted: (1) that a conspiracy
existed “in which [both] the declarant and defendant participated,” (2) the
statement to be admitted was “made during the conspiracy,” and (3) the
statement was “made in furtherance of the conspiracy.” 48 For purposes of
analyzing statements made over the phone, it is best to separate the first
requirement into two preliminary foundational determinations, as they are
discussed separately in Part III of this Comment.
III. Phone Call Statements Made During the Course of and
in Furtherance of the Conspiracy
In a conspiracy, specifically a large conspiracy, it is reasonable to believe
that fellow coconspirators might phone a friend who has been incarcerated.
A common hearsay exception used to introduce prison phone calls concerns
43. Id.
44. United States v. Perez, 989 F.2d 1574, 1577 (10th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (quoting
United States v. Pallais, 921 F.2d 684 (7th Cir. 1990)). But see PAUL C. GIANNELLI,
UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE § 32.10 (3d ed. 2009) (noting that agency theory “is a fiction”
and the federal drafters failed to justify admissibility under an alternative theory related to
trustworthiness of evidence in itself).
45. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 82 (1970) (quoting Grunewald v. United States, 353
U.S. 391, 404 (1957)) (emphasizing the impact of limited scope in conspiracy prosecutions).
46. GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10[B].
47. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
48. GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10.
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statements of an opposing party that “[were] made by the party’s
coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” 49 Rule
801(d)(2)(E) allows “admission of statements by individuals acting in
furtherance of a lawful joint enterprise.” 50 Effectively, the rule operates by
“denying admissibility to statements made after the objectives of the
conspiracy have either failed or been achieved.”51 Prosecutors should give
great attention to detail in conspiracy proceedings at the very beginning of
the trial because the possibility of an appeal always lingers. Therefore, a
prosecutor must have all her cards aligned. The standard of review plays an
important role in how a prosecutor might be able to uphold her case on
appeal, providing a great incentive to play all her cards at the trial level.
Trial courts can act as the be-all and end-all for criminal proceedings
because they receive an extensive level of discretion when making
evidentiary rulings. 52 If a case reaches review, the appellate courts examine
the admission of evidence within the limited scope of the comprehensive
record, determining whether the lower court abused its discretion. 53
Specifically, hearsay admissions by the trial courts are given a heightened
level of deference while on review, 54 and because it must be determined by
the trial court that a coconspirator statement does not fit into hearsay,
appellate courts may be reluctant to find an abuse of discretion.55
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) contains “preliminary foundational determinations,”
and those statements made in the course and in furtherance of a conspiracy
are factual findings reviewed for clear error.56 When applying the clear
error standard, courts “will not reverse a lower court’s finding of fact
simply because [it] ‘would have decided the case differently.’ Rather, a
49. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
50. United States v. Brockenborrugh, 575 F.3d 726, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing United
States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d 197, 201-02 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d
413, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1983)) (acknowledging that the use of the word “conspiracy” is not
required and could be a joint enterprise based off of agency principles).
51. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
52. See United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 873 (10th Cir. 1995).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id. Moreover, the Tenth Circuit
applies a harmless error standard when reviewing trial courts’ rulings on
hearsay objections resting solely on the Federal Rules of Evidence. A harmless
error is one that does not have a substantial influence on the outcome of the
trial; nor does it leave one in grave doubt as to whether it had such effect.
Id. (citing United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1253-55 (10th Cir. 1991)).
56. United States v. Morgan, 748 F.3d 1024, 1036 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Ford v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 298 (2014).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss4/5

2017]

COMMENTS

743

reviewing court must ask whether, ‘on the entire evidence,’ it is ‘left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” 57
The standard for independent proof of a participation within a conspiracy
is “lower than the standard of evidence sufficient to submit a charge of
conspiracy to the jury,” 58 where “the trial court must view the evidence as a
whole, rather than consider the individual pieces in isolation,”59 and once
the existence of the conspiracy has been proven, the evidence required to
link other defendants “need not be overwhelming.” 60 This standard means
that it is especially important for prosecutors to ensure they introduce all
pertinent phone calls at trial because once they meet the initial hurdle of
showing the preliminary foundational determinations for a conspiracy, the
clear error standard will not likely overturn the conviction. 61
Before addressing the preliminary questions, prosecutors should
determine which individual statements will be brought into evidence. The
prosecutor has the upper hand here by being able to prepare an argument
ahead of time for each individual statement. But defense counsel has to play
a “guessing game” and become familiar with the statements to object at the
trial court level. 62 The opportunity for defense counsel to object at the trial
level is crucial to their case because of the heightened level of discretion
given to trial courts in admitting this evidence, 63 and the “clearly
erroneous” standard on appeal is difficult to overcome. 64 Therefore,
prosecutors should do all that they can to bring in whatever statements they
may have.
57. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (first quoting Anderson v. Bessemer
City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985); then twice quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333
U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
58. United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v.
Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1981)).
59. Id. (citing United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1300 (2d Cir. 1977); United
States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1121 (2d Cir. 1969)).
60. Id. (quoting United States v. Provenzano, 615 F.2d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1980)).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
62. A defendant must make a request pursuant to Rule 16(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure to obtain these phone calls. See United States v. Sanchez-Garcia, 685
F.3d 745, 755 (8th Cir. 2012), for an example of how the Eighth Circuit reviews the
disclosure of jailhouse audio recordings obtained by the government.
63. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
64. See supra text accompanying note 56. A cautionary note for prosecutors: “[I]f the
evidence is admitted over objection,” defense counsel will likely “try to convince the jury
that the statement is untrustworthy and therefore should be accorded little weight.” James A.
George, Hearsay: Recognizing It and Handling the Objection, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 489,
492 (1987).
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If an opposing party objects to the statement’s admission under Rule
801(d)(2)(E), a court must answer preliminary questions to ensure that the
statement falls within the rule’s definition. 65 Thus, the prosecutor must
prepare an argument to support these statements prior to any objection.
Defense counsel will likely make a hearsay objection, so courts will begin
by evaluating whether the statement is hearsay, and if it is, courts will
require prosecutors to show the statement meets four preliminary questions
before admitting the statements under the coconspirator exception.66 These
questions can be viewed as separate elements that must be met by a
preponderance of the evidence standard; therefore, the trial court must
determine “(1) that a conspiracy existed; (2) the declarant and the party
against whom the statement is offered were members of the conspiracy; (3)
the statement was made in the course of the conspiracy; and (4) the
statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy.” 67 Each of these
elements will be compared with specifics examples of what is required to
meet them, and will be paired with applications to the prison phone call
system in the following sections.
A. First Element: Establishing the Existence of a Conspiracy
This first element to establish the existence of a conspiracy can be easily
met. A conspiracy only requires “an agreement between two or more
persons . . . with an intent to commit a crime.” 68 At common law, the
conspiracy required independent proof to establish its existence, 69 but in
Bourjaily v. United States—a prominent case concerning admissible
hearsay—the Court abolished this requirement. 70 This ruling was later
codified into the rule itself: “The statement must be considered but does not

65. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987). When deciding preliminary
questions, the court is not obliged to follow any evidence rules, except those on privilege.
FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
66. United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 333 (3d Cir. 1992).
67. Id.; see also Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175. Some courts combine the third and fourth
elements as a statement “made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy." United States v.
Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 404, 406 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d
1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 1978)).
68. GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10[A].
69. Id. § 32.10[D] (“[T]he statement itself could not be used to determine whether a
conspiracy existed.”).
70. 483 U.S. at 181-82 (ruling that the trial court had correctly found an existing
conspiracy and opining that “co-conspirator’s statements [can] themselves be probative of
the existence of . . . and participation . . . in the conspiracy”); GIANNELLI, supra note 44, §
32.10[D].
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by itself establish . . . the existence of the conspiracy.” 71 After the
amendment, it is generally accepted that the statement made by a
coconspirator “could be used to establish the existence of a conspiracy,” but
it is not sufficient. 72 Since Bourjaily and the 1997 amendment, courts may
look toward independent corroborating evidence in affirming trial court
decisions. 73
If the court considers conspiracy statements themselves while making
preliminary factual determinations, these “statements are presumptively
unreliable and, for such statements to be admissible, there must be some
independent corroborating evidence of the defendant’s participation in the
conspiracy.” 74 United States v. Abu-Jihaad provides an example of how to
avoid relying on the conspiracy statement itself as the court stated that the
case exemplified “what the ‘during the course of’ and independent
corroboration requirements are designed to catch,” because the sole
evidence of the defendant’s conspiracy participation was the statement
itself. 75 In Abu-Jihaad, pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the government
moved to admit certain statements made by a third party “five years after
the events that form[ed] the basis of the charges against” the defendant. 76
The court considered the statements and additional evidence, but refused to
find the defendant had entered into a conspiracy, because no additional
corroborating evidence existed to establish the defendant’s participation in
a conspiracy. 77 Thus, those statements were not made “during the course”
of a conspiracy. 78
71. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2); see also GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10[D].
72. United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1361 (3d Cir. 1991).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Zambrana, 841 F.2d 1320, 1346 (7th Cir. 1988).
74. United States v. Tellier, 83 F.3d 578, 580 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted) (citing
Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 179); United States v. Clark, 18 F.3d 1337, 1341-42 (6th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380, 1386 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Bentvena, 319
F.2d 916, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1963)). “‘Some’ independent evidence is not merely a scintilla,
but rather enough to rebut the presumed unreliability of hearsay. Admissibility of the
hearsay, therefore, hinges on whether some sufficiently corroborating evidence exists which
overcomes the suspected unreliability of out-of-court statements.” Clark, 18 F.3d at 1342
(citing United States v. Silverman, 861 F.2d 571, 579 (9th Cir. 1988)).
75. 531 F. Supp. 2d 289, 298 (D. Conn. 2008) (noting the similarity of the case to
Tellier and thus reaching the same conclusion).
76. Id. at 295 (emphasizing those statements as being only one example of many).
77. Id. at 298.
There simply is no independent evidence that corroborates Mr. Abu-jihaad’s
participation in a conspiracy with Mr. Shareef in early October 2006. That is
made plain from the fact that the Government’s opening brief relied solely
upon Mr. Shareef’s own statements to prove the existence of the conspiracy in
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B. Second Element: Establishing Membership of the Conspiracy Between
the Declarant and the Party Against Whom the Statement Is Offered
Prosecutors must be able to show that “both the declarant and the
defendant were members of the conspiracy”79 at the time the statement was
made. When determining this, the analysis is similar to that used to
establish the existence of a conspiracy. 80 It is generally thought that once
the declarant has been arrested, his participation in the conspiracy has
terminated, therefore rendering his post-arrest statement inadmissible
against a defendant. 81 This becomes particularly relevant when trying to
establish the third element—a statement being made during the course of
the conspiracy—which is discussed in detail in the following section. It is
entirely possible, however, for a conspiracy to continue while
incarcerated. 82 Thus, prosecutors focus first on the declarant as being a
member of the conspiracy.
The declarant has many opportunities to join or withdraw from the
conspiracy during the defendant’s incarceration, and the defendant need not
know of the declarant’s status during a phone call. 83 Courts seem to put the
most emphasis on illustrating separate arguments for both the declarant and
the defendant, showing they were members of an ongoing conspiracy while
the statement was made. 84 In addition, “[T]he court[s] can look at the
substance of the challenged co-conspirator testimony, as well as
independent evidence, to determine whether or not [the party] was a
participant in the conspiracy.” 85 This broad, sweeping language
demonstrates how far courts will go to find supporting evidence and seems
to favor prosecutors. The language also supports and provides another
example of why prosecutors should always exploit their ability to
corroborate evidence: it will more likely help than hurt them on review.
early October 2006.
Id. at 296.
78. Id. at 298.
79. GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10[A].
80. See generally Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).
81. GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10[A].
82. Id. § 32.10[A] n.104.
83. See United States v. Lampley, 68 F.3d 1296, 1301 (11th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging
that declarations of a coconspirator are “admissible against members of the conspiracy who
joined after the statement was made.” (quoting United States v. Tombrelo, 666 F.2d 485,
491 (11th Cir. 1982)).
84. See, e.g., Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 618 (1953); United States v. Cruz,
797 F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1986); see also GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10[A].
85. United States v. Allison, 908 F.2d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1990).
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To determine whether the declarant or defendant was a member of the
conspiracy, prosecutors and courts can look to several areas. To show
membership in a conspiracy, “each coconspirator need not know of or have
contact with all other members, nor must they know all of the details of the
conspiracy or participate in every act in furtherance of it.”86 In fact,
evidence of another separate conspiracy can help provide a basis for
admitting a coconspirator statement.87 Additionally, “[p]articipation in a
criminal conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; a common
purpose or agreement to accomplish an unlawful objective may be inferred
from a ‘development and a collocation of circumstances.’” 88 A “single
overt act by the defendant” may also be sufficient.89 The identification of
the declarant is not required and “[s]ometimes evidence, usually
circumstantial in nature, will convince the trial judge that it is more likely
than not that an unidentified declarant was a participant in a conspiracy
together with the party against whom the declarant’s assertion has been
offered.” 90 While identification is not required for the declarant, it is in the
prosecutor’s best interest to try and authenticate the declarant’s identity. 91
Some prosecutors may face large conspiracy cases, and these may be
analyzed differently in determining if the declarant and defendant were
members of the conspiracy. These large and complex conspiracy cases can
make it “inconvenient or impossible for the Government to prove the
existence of the conspiracy and/or the participation therein of each of the
alleged co-conspirators, prior to seeking admission of a co-conspirator’s
statement.” 92 To remedy this, the government has an obligation prior to the
close of the case to prove the existence of the conspiracy for each
individual coconspirator. 93 This also favors prosecutors, as they may gain
additional evidence throughout the trial concerning the identification of
those coconspirators on the phone. The next two elements concern the
strategic and fundamental elements when answering the preliminary
questions to admit coconspirator statements. These are key because the
86. United States v. Martínez-Medina, 279 F.3d 105, 113 (1st Cir. 2002).
87. United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2002) (adding that the separate
conspiracy can be larger than the conspiracy charged).
88. United States v. Pack, 773 F.2d 261, 265-66 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting Glassner v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942)).
89. United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489, 1500 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Pack,
773 F.2d at 266).
90. DAVID F. BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK § 35:12 (4th ed. 2011).
91. See supra text accompanying note 18.
92. United States v. Giampa, 904 F. Supp. 235, 286 (D.N.J. 1995).
93. Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1360-61 (3d Cir. 1991).
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defense will most likely challenge these statements and it may be difficult
in some situations to show an ongoing conspiracy while a defendant
remains incarcerated.
C. Third Element: Establishing a Statement Made During the Course of the
Conspiracy
When examining whether a statement was made during the course of the
conspiracy, the prosecutor must consider the agreement of the conspiracy
and the objective of the conspiracy. 94 In turn, the court will “carefully
ascertain the nature and extent of a conspiracy in determining whether acts
or statements can properly be viewed as made during its existence.” 95 This
requirement illustrates why the drafters of the federal rules decided to base
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) on agency theory, stating their intent as being “consistent
with the position of the Supreme Court in denying admissibility to
statements made after the objectives of the conspiracy have either failed or
been achieved.” 96 This shows that the object of the conspiracy is crucial to
determine whether an act was made during the course of the conspiracy.
Luckily, prosecutors may have some flexibility in defining the main
objective of the conspiracy. 97
Generally, the conspiracy ends upon completion or failure to complete
the main or central conspiratorial objectives.98 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly rejected the argument that an “implicit subsidiary phase”
automatically begins after completion with the sole objective of concealing
the conspiracy. 99 An early example of the Court’s rejection of this argument
began with Krulewitch v. United States,100 where “the Court rejected the
government’s argument that statements made after the main objective of the
conspiracy had been achieved were nonetheless admissible if made to
conceal the crime.” 101 Krulewitch pointed out that if the Court adopted the
government’s argument, it could cause “far-reaching results” and risk an
unnecessary expansion of the rule against hearsay, leading to most, if not
all, statements potentially being construed as a statement made to prevent
94. GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10[B].
95. United States v. Perez, 989 F.2d 1574, 1579 (10th Cir. 1993) (keeping in mind the
limited scope set by the Court for hearsay exceptions).
96. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed
rules).
97. GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10[B].
98. See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 400 (1957).
99. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1949).
100. Id. at 442-43.
101. Perez, 989 F.2d at 1579.
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detection, punishment, or made to shield fellow coconspirators. 102 While
this may be an unfavorable ruling for prosecutors, it does not impede their
ability to prove such a statement in a prison phone call setting thanks to the
Court’s subsequent decision in Lutwak v. United States. 103
In applying the teaching of Krulewitch, the Lutwak Court further
enumerated the limits of admitting coconspirator declarations.104 This
distinction is essential:
Relevant declarations or admissions of a conspirator made in the
absence of the co-conspirator, and not in furtherance of the
conspiracy, may be admissible in a trial for conspiracy as against
the declarant to prove the declarant’s participation therein. The
court must be careful at the time of the admission and by its
instructions to make it clear that the evidence is limited as
against the declarant only. Therefore, when the trial court admits
against all of the conspirators a relevant declaration of one of the
conspirators after the conspiracy has ended, without limiting it to
the declarant, it violates the rule laid down in Krulewitch. Such
declaration is inadmissible as to all but the declarant.105
This situation will only apply to prosecutors when the coconspirator arrest
ends the conspiracy for the incarcerated. For example, Albert and Brandon
were members of a conspiracy to kill Charlie. Albert is incarcerated for
shoplifting and makes a phone call to Brandon. Assume incarceration has
ended Albert’s participation in achieving the conspiracy’s objective to kill
Charlie because he can no longer participate in the conspiracy. Brandon
tells Albert that the plan to kill Charlie is still ongoing and further discloses
details of the conspiracy’s plan to commit this crime all while Albert simply
acknowledges these statements. Krulewitch only allows Brandon’s
statements to be used to show his participation in the conspiracy—not
Albert’s participation. When this occurs, the usefulness of the statement is
necessarily marginalized.
Krulewitch still applies today, though many courts have clarified certain
characteristics regarding the concealment phase of the conspiracy. 106
Shortly after the decision in Krulewitch, the Supreme Court addressed yet

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 444-45.
344 U.S. 604 (1953).
Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 618.
Id. at 615.
GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10[B].
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another case concerning the admission of conspirator statements.107 The
Court in Grunewald v. United States reaffirmed the Krulewitch standard in
a short opinion. 108 Justice Jackson thereafter clarified the Court’s
expectations in his concurring opinion. 109 Jackson boiled down the
government’s argument as follows: “a conspiracy to conceal is being
implied from elements which will be present in virtually every conspiracy
case, that is, secrecy plus overt acts of concealment.” 110 He then dismissed
this argument again because it attempted to broaden the narrow rule.111 But
he did not rule out the possibility that acts of concealing a conspiracy could
carry weight in the furtherance requirement. 112 And courts have given this
weight; 113 therefore prosecutors should assert that concealment of a
conspiracy plays a meaningful role in satisfying the “in furtherance”
requirement.
Switching back to the main object of a conspiracy, it is presumed that the
conspiracy continues until completion of the main objective 114 or an
affirmative showing of termination or withdrawal from the conspiracy. 115
“[W]here a conspiracy contemplates a continuity of purpose and a
continued performance of acts, it is presumed to exist until there has been
an affirmative showing that it has terminated; and its members continue to
be conspirators until there has been an affirmative showing that they have
withdrawn.” 116 Postponing the main objective of the conspiracy or slowing
down the process does not explicitly show termination of the conspiracy. 117

107. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
108. Id. at 399.
109. See id. at 400-24 (Jackson, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 404.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 405 (“By no means does this mean that acts of concealment can never have
significance in furthering a criminal conspiracy. But a vital distinction must be made
between acts of concealment done in furtherance of the main criminal objectives of the
conspiracy, and acts of concealment done after these central objectives have been attained,
for the purpose only of covering up after the crime.”).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Hong Vo, 978 F. Supp. 2d 49, 55-57 (D.D.C. 2013);
United States v. Alberico, 559 F.3d 24, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Justus, 162
F.3d 1157 (4th Cir. 1998), 1998 WL 546095 at *6.
114. United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 253 (3d Cir. 1983).
115. United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 660 (7th Cir. 1995).
116. United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1268 (6th Cir. 1982) (alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 642-43 (6th Cir. 1975)).
117. Ammar, 714 F.2d at 253.
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In addition, the arrest of one of the conspirators or the principal member
does not automatically terminate participation in the conspiracy. 118
The defendant bears the burden of showing withdrawal from a
conspiracy by proving an “attempt to undo the wrong that has been done in
one of two ways”: (1) “giv[ing] authorities information with sufficient
particularity to enable the authorities to take some action to end the
conspiracy”; or (2) “communicat[ing] his withdrawal directly to his
coconspirators in a manner that reasonably and effectively notifies the
conspirators that he will no longer be included in the conspiracy.”119 “The
second method ‘requires more than implied dissociation. It must be
sufficiently clear and delivered to those with authority in the conspiracy
such that a jury could conclude that it was reasonably calculated to make
the dissociation known to the organization.’” 120 Overall, the burden is high
on the defendant to prove withdrawal from the conspiracy. If the defendant
is incarcerated, however, the prosecutor is likely to bear the burden of
proving the defendant was not terminated from the conspiracy and did not
withdraw from the conspiracy merely by being incarcerated.
The main objective of a conspiracy informs how far a conspiracy may
continue. 121 Stemming from the Court’s reluctance in Krulewitch and
Grunewald to broadly admit implicit subsidiary agreements to conceal a
conspiracy (paired with the presumption of continuation), lower courts may
carefully reason through each statement with a critical eye to ensure the
party has met its high burden. 122 Courts determine the duration of a
conspiracy on a case-by-case basis, 123 and the “nature of the crime” is
relevant. 124 For example, in a conspiracy to kidnap, the conspirators had a
central purpose to kidnap, obtain money, and then divide the proceeds
amongst the coconspirators. 125 The admitted phone call contained
statements discussing concerns over the proceeds, furthering the central

118. Id.
119. United States v. Randall, 661 F.3d 1291, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 2011).
120. United States v. Morgan, 748 F.3d 1024, 1037 (10th Cir.) (quoting Randall, 661
F.3d at 1295), cert. denied sub nom. Ford v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 298 (2014).
121. See Mark Lippman, Defending Against the Co-Conspirator Hearsay Exception,
CHAMPION, Aug. 1997, at 16, 18.
122. See id. at 17-18 (“The timing of the subsidiary agreement is crucial, and the
government bears the burden of proving it was formed during the principal conspiracy.”).
123. United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1362 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Lippman,
supra note 121, at 18.
124. Lippman, supra note 121, at 18.
125. Morgan, 748 F.3d at 1036.
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purpose for kidnapping for money. 126 The court stated that “[i]t is well
settled that the distribution of the proceeds of a conspiracy is an act
occurring during the pendency of the conspiracy.”127 When the “general
objective of the conspirators is money, the conspiracy does not end, of
necessity, before the spoils are divided among the miscreants.”128 This type
of call can apply to a prison phone call as well. Taking the kidnapping
example from above and applying it to Albert and Brandon again, Albert
may need money to support his incarceration and therefore calls Brandon to
discuss distributions of the proceeds from their kidnapping escapade. These
statements occur during the concealment phase of the conspiracy, but are
admissible under the exception because Albert and Brandon are pursuing
the main objective of conspiracy—to obtain money—even while Albert is
incarcerated.
The most important concern a prosecutor may face is to show the court
that incarceration or arrest of one or more coconspirators, the principal
member, or even all but one member of the conspiracy does not necessarily
cause the conspiracy to end. 129 In some cases, “[i]f the conspiracy is
ongoing, assertions made by the remaining conspirators may be introduced
against the one arrested, though made after the arrest.” 130 For example, in
United States v. Marques, Marques was arrested and convicted for a
conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. 131 Upon review, Marques
challenged evidence admitted “after he allegedly dropped out of the
conspiracy,” 132 contending that “when he abandoned the venture, was
arrested and cooperated with the authorities, the conspiracy ended as to
him, and all acts and declarations by other conspirators thereafter should
not have been considered in assessing his guilt.” 133 But the court rejected
his argument, stating that “[t]he acts and declarations of coconspirators,
done or made in furtherance of the conspiracy, are admissible against a
conspirator whose participation has terminated because of arrest.” 134
Therefore, while Marques stated that he had abandoned the venture, his acts
126. Id.
127. Id. (quoting United States v. Davis, 766 F.2d 1452, 1458 (10th Cir. 1985)).
128. United States v. Knuckles, 581 F.2d 305, 313 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing United States v.
Floyd, 555 F.2d 45, 48 n.10 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Manarite, 448 F.2d 583, 591 (2d
Cir. 1971)).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82.
130. BINDER, supra note 90, § 35:11.
131. 600 F.2d 742, 743 (9th Cir. 1979).
132. Id. at 745.
133. Id. at 750.
134. Id. (citing United States v. Wentz, 456 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1972)).
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reflected a different conclusion and he failed to convince the court as to any
reasons to be treated differently. 135 Unfortunately, the court did not delve
into what acts Marques committed that warranted their conclusion in spite
of his statements of abandoning the conspiracy. The court seemed reluctant
to adopt Marques’s argument, as it would limit the coconspirator
participation in the conspiracy after arrest, as discussed in the following
paragraph.
Marques relied on the decision in Sandez v. United States, where the
court believed that “the moment of any conspirator’s arrest is decisive as to
him, even if it should be maintained that the arrest of the first conspirator is
not conclusive as to all.” 136 In addition, the arrested conspirator may believe
that “the conspiracy has been thwarted, and presumably no other overt act
contributing to the conspiracy can possibly take place at least so far as the
arrested conspirator is concerned.” 137 The Sandez court looked to an older
Supreme Court case, Fiswick v. United States, 138 where the Court “laid
down the rule that although the result of the conspiracy may be a continuing
one, the conspiracy itself does not become a continuing one.” 139 Therefore a
“[c]onfession or admission by one coconspirator after he has been
apprehended is not in any sense a furtherance of the criminal enterprise.”140
This can be interpreted as an example of courts trying to preclude the use of
statements made after a coconspirator has been arrested.
These cases can be compared with the outcome in United States v.
Grubb. 141 There, the court noted “ample evidence for the district court to
find that the conspiracy had continued after the . . . arrests.”142 “In the
absence of definite proof, [a] withdrawal from the conspiracy, or [an]
abandonment of it, will not be presumed.” 143 The “[a]rrest of some coconspirators does not, as a matter of law, terminate a conspiracy.” 144 The
arrests in Grubb did not end the conspiracy but merely made the
participants more cautious. 145

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id. at 750 n.4 (quoting Sandez v. United States, 239 F.2d 239, 243 (9th Cir. 1956)).
Sandez, 239 F.2d at 243.
329 U.S. 211 (1946).
Sandez, 239 F.2d at 243 (discussing Fiswick).
Id. at 244 (quoting Fiswick, 329 U.S. at 217).
527 F.2d 1107 (4th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1109.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In another case using arrests to determine the continuation of a
conspiracy, the court concluded that “[t]he fact that Urrego and one of his
co-conspirators were arrested did not necessarily mean that the conspiracy
was terminated.” 146 Urrego argued “that since he and Restrepo already had
been apprehended and the cocaine seized, the statements made by Rivera
during the monitored telephone conversations were outside of the course of
the conspiracy.” 147 Yet the court concluded “[t]here was ample evidence for
the district court to conclude that Rivera’s statements were made in the
course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” 148 The defendants made
similar arguments to those in Marques. 149 Nonetheless, courts remain
unsympathetic, especially to those continuing to oversee the conspiracy
while incarcerated.150 In short, a prosecutor will want to gain a feel for her
circuit’s stance on whether an arrest ends the conspiracy or whether it can
continue under certain circumstances. Even if the court seems reluctant to
reject the argument, the prosecutor should push the issue anyway.
D. Fourth Element: Establishing a Statement Made in Furtherance of the
Conspiracy
The requirements that a statement must be made during the course of the
conspiracy and in furtherance of the conspiracy are closely linked151 such
that a prosecutor will often find himself aggregating the evidence.
Unfortunately, “[n]o talismanic formula exists for ascertaining whether a
particular statement was intended by the declarant to further the
conspiracy.” 152 Rather, “this determination must be made by examining the
context in which the challenged statement was made.” 153 Courts split on the
application of this element, 154 but on review, the standard of construction
146. United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234, 1240 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Grubb,
527 F.2d at 1109).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 743-50 (9th Cir. 1979).
150. See United States v. Babb, 369 F. App’x 503, 510 (4th Cir. 2010).
151. United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 253 (3d Cir. 1983).
152. United States v. Heidarpour, No. CR-11-109-M, 2012 WL 2825810, at *1 (W.D.
Okla. July 10, 2012) (quoting United States v. Perez, 989 F.2d 1574, 1578 (10th Cir. 1993)).
153. Id. (quoting Perez, 989 F.2d at 1579).
154. See Perez, 989 F.2d at 1578. Compare United States v. Ciresi, 697 F.3d 19, 28-30
(1st Cir. 2012) (applying a broad construction of the “in furtherance” requirement), and
United States v. Kocher, 948 F.2d 483, 485 (8th Cir. 1991) (maintaining that the “in
furtherance” requirement be construed broadly), with United States v. Rutland, 705 F.3d
1238, 1252 (10th Cir. 2013) (highlighting the four kinds of statements the Tenth Circuit
finds to satisfy the “in furtherance” requirement), and United States v. Johnson, 927 F.2d
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should minimally affect evidentiary rulings due to the high level of
discretion given to trial courts.155
Courts tend not to apply the “in furtherance” requirement strictly because
it would defeat the purpose of the hearsay exception.156 For example, in one
conspiracy charge for possession with intent to distribute, the Fifth Circuit
considered statements made from one conspirator to another coconspirator
identifying another fellow coconspirator as the purchaser of marijuana to be
statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy. 157 As the Fifth Circuit
reasoned, “It has been held that a statement by a person acting as a
connection informing the ultimate purchaser of the identity of the source is
a statement in furtherance of the conspiracy.” 158 The burden is not high to
meet here and often, if all the other elements are met, courts might be
willing to stretch their views to meet this last requirement. Thus, these
decisions tend to favor the prosecution.
A statement furthers a conspiracy if it promotes the conspiracy’s main
objectives or furthers the conspiracy’s goals in some way. 159 Generally,
narratives or narrative declarations of past events between coconspirators
are not considered to be in furtherance of the conspiracy, but statements
that reflect future intent to “set transactions integral to the conspiracy in
motion and maintain the information flow among coconspirators” do meet
the requirement. 160 Return to the example with Albert and Brandon: Albert
is incarcerated for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine. Albert
and Brandon are both members of a large drug-trafficking conspiracy run
by a prominent drug lord that the federal government is trying to take down.
Albert calls Brandon to tell him that he made arrangements with other
inmates to distribute cocaine after he is released on bail. This statement can
be considered to be “in furtherance of the conspiracy” because Albert
arranged to further distribute cocaine in connection with the large drug999, 1001-02 (7th Cir. 1991) (emphasizing the limitations on admitting co-conspirator
statements and adhering to a narrow construction of the “in furtherance” requirement). But
see United States v. Cornett, 195 F.3d 776, 782-85 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying a mixed level
of construction using strict and broad language).
155. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
156. United States v. Patton, 594 F.2d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 1979); see also United States v.
McMurray, 34 F.3d 1405, 1412 (8th Cir. 1994) (favoring admissibility); United States v.
Gibbs, 739 F.2d 838, 845 (3d Cir. 1984) (using a broad interpretation).
157. Patton, 594 F.2d at 447 (noting that statements unnecessary to the conspiracy can be
held to further the conspiracy).
158. Id.
159. Perez, 989 F.2d at 1578.
160. United States v. Roberts, 14 F.3d 502, 514-15 (10th Cir. 1993).
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trafficking conspiracy case, and therefore the statement is admissible. Other
examples showing statements to be in furtherance of the conspiracy include
statements that identify other conspiracy members, describe roles within the
conspiracy, induce conspiracy enlistment, further participation in group
activities, reassure the existence of a conspiracy, dispel fears or suspicions,
and keep members up-to-date on conspiracy activities. 161
Casual conversations made between coconspirators without the intent to
encourage continued involvement or actions not advancing the conspiracy
do not meet the “in furtherance” requirement.162 Therefore, Albert and
Brandon chatting about how Charlie, another fellow coconspirator, “made a
huge drop the other day” cannot meet the “in furtherance” requirement
because Albert and Brandon are only speaking about past events.
Again, to utilize the coconspirator exception, a conspiracy charge is not
needed. 163 “Subject to relevancy and similar considerations, out-of-court
statements of a declarant coconspirator, if made during and in furtherance
of a conspiracy, are admissible for the truth of the matter asserted,
regardless of whether the conspiracy furthered is charged or
uncharged. . . .” 164 The statement is also admissible “regardless of whether
it is identical to or different from the crime that the statements are offered to
prove.” 165 In general,
[a]s long as it is shown that a party, having joined a conspiracy,
is aware of the conspiracy’s features and general aims,
statements pertaining to the details of plans to further the
conspiracy can be admitted against the party even if the party
does not have specific knowledge of the acts spoken of. 166
The acquittal of an alleged coconspirator does not preclude the trial
judge from finding participation in a conspiracy. 167 Thus, if those assertions
are offered against a fellow coconspirator, the statements made may be
allowed through a hearsay exception. 168
161. Id. at 515; United States v. Heidarpour, No. CR-11-109-M, 2012 WL 2825810, at
*1 (W.D. Okla. July 10, 2012).
162. United States v. Gibbs, 739 F.2d 838, 845 (3d Cir. 1984).
163. United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1339 (8th Cir. 1985).
164. United States v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183, 196 (1st Cir. 1999).
165. Id.
166. United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 25 (1st Cir. 2002) (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Angiulo, 847 F.2d 956, 969 (1st Cir. 1988), abrogated on other
grounds by Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991)).
167. Id. at 18.
168. BINDER, supra note 90, § 35:12.
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Overall, when admitting statements through the coconspirator exception,
courts can have different understandings and applications of Rule
801(d)(2)(E). For example, consider the Eighth Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Smith. 169 In Smith, four coconspirators (Leonard Smith, Myron
Jackson, Russell Spearman, and Faustino Selvera) were involved in a large
conspiracy to distribute heroin. 170 Ike Conway was also involved in the
conspiracy, but Conway worked as an informant for the government and
was the primary witness at trial.171 In this case, Conway wore a body
transmitter to record conservations between alleged conspiracy members,
and a wiretap was also installed on Selvera’s phone. 172 Smith concerned a
conspiracy to distribute heroin where the appellants had challenged
statements relating to the conspiracy and admitted into evidence via tape
recordings. 173
The trial court admitted many of these tapes, including conversations
between Conway and Jackson (referencing prior heroin deals), Conway and
Selvera (referencing payments received from Smith), Conway and Smith
(where Conway made attempts to set up meetings), Selvera and Smith (after
Selvera had been warned by the Drug Enforcement Administration that he
was going to be placed under surveillance), and a call from Smith to
Selvera (explaining that Smith should not continue business there because
he was under surveillance).174 The Eighth Circuit held that these statements
were improperly admitted and those inadmissible statements were tested as
to whether their admission reasonably contributed to the conviction. 175
The Eighth Circuit held that the recorded statements between Conway
and Jackson were inadmissible because neither were still members of the
conspiracy when the statements were made. 176 This tape only concerned
past dealings with Jackson and the remainder of Conway’s statements were
“largely cumulative” as to the evidence used against them. 177 The court,
however, did find reversible error in the statements made between Conway
and Smith because those improperly admitted statements could have
reasonably contributed to his conviction. 178 Two judges disagreed on how
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

578 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1228.
Id.
Id. at 1230.
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1230.
Id. at 1233.
Id.
Id. at 1234.
Id. at 1234-35.
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to apply both 801(d)(2)(E) and the reversible error standard on appeal.
Judge Heaney wrote the opinion, and Judge Lay concurred in the judgment
but viewed the application in another light.179 Judge Ross, on the other
hand, provided yet another analysis, dissenting in the decision to grant a
new trial to one of the defendants. 180
Like Judge Heaney, Judge Lay agreed that the tapes between Jackson
and Conway were inadmissible since they were not members of the
conspiracy at the time the statements were made. 181 But Judge Lay agreed
with the government “that the Selvera-Conway, Smith-Conway and SmithSelvera tapes were made during the course of the conspiracy and in
furtherance of it.” 182 He remarked on the necessary proof of the continued
conspiracy between Selvera and Smith even after Conway’s arrest:
“Selvera’s conversations with Smith create a permissible inference that the
conspiracy between the two of them remained alive and that further drug
distribution would take place when the opportunity presented itself.”183
Judge Lay went even further in his analysis, stating that “even assuming the
conspiracy had terminated, Smith’s statements would still be admissible
against him as admissions against his interest. A conspirator’s statement
made after a conspiracy has always been held admissible against the
declarant as an admission against interest.”184 Overall, he concluded that
even if those taped conversations were admissible, they constituted
harmless error as to Smith. 185 Yet another judge, Judge Ross, viewed this
differently.
Judge Ross agreed with Judge Lay that a conspiracy existed and
continued between Selvera and Smith even after the departure of Spearman
and Jackson and after Conway’s arrest. 186 But Judge Ross believed that “the
statements made by either Selvera or Smith in the furtherance of the
conspiracy were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of

179. Id. at 1236 (Lay, J., concurring); see also id. at 1239 (Ross, J., concurring and
dissenting in part) (“I agree with Judge Lay that the conspiracy, at least as between Smith
and Selvera, continued after Spearman and Jackson left it and after Conway’s arrest.
Therefore, the statements made by either Selvera or Smith in the furtherance of the
conspiracy were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”).
180. Id. at 1239 (Ross, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
181. Id. at 1236-37 (Lay, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 1237.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1238.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1239 (Ross, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Evidence.” 187 Judge Ross distinguished the statements, determining the
relevancy as to whom each statement was made because “[e]ven though
Conway’s tape recorded statements to Smith and Selvera, after the
conspiracy terminated as to Conway, were inadmissible, tape recorded
statements by either Smith or Selvera, to each other or to Conway, were
admissible. Both defendants made statements incriminating Smith.”188
Although the taped recordings in Smith did not involve a tape-recorded
prison phone call, the analysis used is similar to what can be used in
admitting statements taken from a prison phone call. Judges look at each
aspect and can come to different conclusions as illustrated by Smith. As
Judge Lay mentioned, the concept of the 801(d)(2)(A) party-opponent
admission can kick in if the statements are found not to be “in furtherance”
of the conspiracy. 189 Therefore, the inmate must be aware of Rule
801(d)(2)(A), because a singular statement or admission of the inmate can
be introduced if the statement “was made by the party in an individual or
representative capacity.” 190 As noted in Part II, the individual partyopponent admission provides an easier way to admit statements and should
thus be ruled out before jumping to coconspirator statements, unless the
prosecutor is attempting to perform an evidentiary catchall, penalizing both
the declarant and the defendant alike for their statements made on the phone
call.
IV. Comprehensive Overview for Admitting Prison Phone Calls Through
the Coconspirator Hearsay Exception
To admit prison phone calls under the coconspirator hearsay exception,
the preliminary foundational determinations must be established by a
preponderance of the evidence at the trial court level. 191 To review, those
preliminary questions are (1) that a conspiracy existed, (2) the declarant and
the party against whom the statement is offered were members of the
conspiracy, (3) the statement was made in the course of the conspiracy, and
(4) the statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy. 192 Each of
these elements must be introduced prior to admission for each individual
statement. 193 The phone call cannot be introduced as a whole. 194
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id. at 1240 (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying note 184.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
See supra text accompanying note 67.
See id.
See FED. R. EVID. 801(a) (defining statement in its singular form).
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Often the facts introduced to establish each statement can overlap with
each of the foundational determinations. The first preliminary question
establishes the existence of a conspiracy. For an inmate, the existence of a
conspiracy can be challenging to establish because it is often thought that
the individual’s actions and participation with the conspiracy end once
apprehended. As Part III explained, some courts split on this approach. But
a simple framework exists that prosecutors should follow to determine the
existence of a conspiracy, which can easily be met.
To establish the existence of a conspiracy, the first question is: How
large of a conspiracy is alleged? 195 This is an easy place to begin because
prosecutors should be able to approximate the size of the conspiracy before
trial. 196 If the conspiracy is large, officers or detectives may be working
alongside the prosecution team and can provide general estimates of the
size of the conspiracy. 197 This can help prosecutors immensely, as they are
only required to establish the existence and members of the conspiracy
prior to the close of the trial, not at the beginning. 198 Therefore, prosecutors
may be able to establish each individual’s participation as the evidence
comes into play and not worry about this burden up front. 199
Another important inquiry for prosecutors to consider is: To whom is the
statement being offered against? This question is imperative because it
requires separate concerns for a statement brought against an incarcerated
prisoner as compared to a declarant on the other end of the phone line. As
seen in the above examples, if incarcerated Albert calls Brandon, a fellow
coconspirator, and tells him he sold drugs to Charlie, the prosecutor would
not have to establish the statement as a coconspirator admission and could
bring this statement in as an individual party-opponent admission under
801(d)(2)(A). 200 But if the prosecutor determines she wants to use
statements made by the declarant on the phone line, she must utilize the

194. See id. In theory, the entire phone call may be introduced if each statement meets
the necessary requirements, but this is unlikely to be the case.
195. Ideally, prosecutors can anticipate the size of the conspiracy before bringing the
suit.
196. Coconspirators should have a rough estimate on the general size of the conspiracy if
they are being held accountable for all actions of other coconspirators.
197. See supra text accompanying note 23.
198. See supra text accompanying note 93.
199. “However, if the evidence is not introduced by the end of the prosecution’s case, a
mistrial may be required.” GIANNELLI, supra note 44, § 32.10[D].
200. See supra Section II.B.
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hearsay
exception
regarding
coconspirator
admissions
under
801(d)(2)(E). 201
The next preliminary determination is to establish that the declarant and
defendant were members of the conspiracy. This element is similar to
establishing the existence of a conspiracy, but the timing of the conspiracy
itself carries more importance at this level. The main question to consider in
this section is: Did the conspiracy end for the incarcerated defendant? Here,
timing is important based on the underlying conspiracy charge. 202 For
example, in a conspiracy to commit a murder, the conspiracy likely ended
for the incarcerated inmate once apprehended because the inmate will not
be able to further the conspiracy while in prison, as concealing the murder
will not constitute the main objective of the conspiracy. But compared with
a drug conspiracy case, an incarcerated inmate remains able to continue the
main objective. In prison, one could socialize with other prisoners and
negotiate drug deals with those who may be getting out of jail soon. After
making these negotiations, the prisoner could call a coconspirator and
inform them to prepare for these new deals. Therefore, the prosecutor
should look to the underlying conspiracy charge to assist her determination
of whether the declarant and the defendant were members of the conspiracy
after the defendant’s incarceration.
Prosecutors must be aware that inmates want to establish themselves as
outside of the conspiracy once incarcerated. If the prisoner withholds
contact from coconspirators who are not incarcerated or if the prisoner was
incarcerated on other grounds outside of the conspiracy, he may be able to
convince courts that his participation has ended, and the prosecution bears
the burden of showing that his acts prove otherwise. Keep in mind that this
does not necessarily free the inmate from all liability, as the court retains
discretion. 203
Whether a coconspirator statement is admissible does not turn on
whether the statement was made between coconspirators. 204 This situation
likely only arises in few circumstances. An example of this would be a
prisoner who passes along a statement to his unknowing family member
who is not involved in the conspiracy and that family member later
201. There may be a limited situation where the prosecutor can gain access to the calls
for the purpose of catching the declarant on the hook for a party admission, but it has many
opportunities to fail because the defendants may challenge the purpose for obtaining the
prison records. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 121, 123-25.
203. See supra text accompanying note 52.
204. See supra text accompanying note 86.
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communicates that statement to someone involved in the conspiracy who
recognizes what it means through code or slang. This situation makes it
difficult to establish the statement because the prosecutor would need
familiarity with all facts of the case, the other members involved in the
conspiracy, and typical slang or code words used. Stated another way,
Albert tells his mother, Bernice, to speak with Charlie and tell him, “Danny
started drinking milk 205 again, and I think Charlie and I should too.” This
statement could be construed as a coconspirator statement made during and
in furtherance of the conspiracy, but if Bernice were to testify regarding this
statement at trial, then it would be inadmissible hearsay unless the
prosecutor could show that the statement was either an individual party
admission and provide additional corroborating evidence to support the
significance of the statement, or as a coconspirator admission made by
Albert himself.
Another preliminary determination the prosecutor must consider is
whether the statement was made during the course of the conspiracy. 206
This determination hinges on the existence of a conspiracy that both the
declarant and the defendant were a part of at the time the statement was
made. 207 Therefore, this question will only be raised if (1) there was a
conspiracy capable of continuing and (2) the conspiracy continued after
incarceration. Part III provided examples based on the main objective of the
conspiracy. To recap, if the main objective has been completed, the
conspiracy cannot continue in prison. 208 Consider another example of this:
Albert and Brandon engage in a conspiracy to commit fraudulent stock
transfers. Albert was arrested because he violated the Securities Exchange
Act through his workplace and called Brandon from the prison to discuss
business. During the call, Albert told Brandon to commit a few more
fraudulent stock transfers, falling within the scope of during the course of
the conspiracy. This example could also be used to satisfy the “in
furtherance” requirement of a conspiracy209 because it involves a statement
made to induce further action on the part of the conspirators, 210 thus

205. Brad Hamilton, A to Z: Deadly Slang by Gangs of New York, N.Y. POST (Oct. 28,
2012, 4:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2012/10/28/a-to-z-deadly-slang-by-gangs-of-new-york/
(defining “drinking milk” as a gang term “for targeting or killing a rival”).
206. See supra Section III.C.
207. See supra text accompanying note 79.
208. See supra text accompanying note 114.
209. See supra Section III.D.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 159, 161.
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illustrating how the same statement might be used to establish different
preliminary determinations.
V. Conclusion
Prison phone calls offer prosecutors a potential evidentiary cash cow in a
criminal trial. If a prosecutor wonders what a defendant may be discussing
via prison phone calls, she must subpoena the prison and outline reasonable
expectations of what she may find to satisfy the court. She may be able to
introduce statements made by an individual party-opponent or she may be
able to introduce the statements through the coconspirator admission, so
long as she can satisfy the preliminary determinations despite likely
objections from defense counsel. Laying out these requirements allows
prosecutors to determine precisely how they may benefit from filtering
through these valuable calls. More likely than not, prosecutors can use this
evidence to strengthen their cases and win big.
Laura M. Cochran
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